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FOREWORD 
This paper is one of several studies done at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences’ Insti-
tute for World Economics ((IWE) under the CIS Strategic Research Project. A contract 
between the Hungarian Prime Minister's Office and the Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
in the summer of 2007, allowed some new, wide-ranging thematic research into the 
post-Soviet space to be launched. The project entitled “Hungary’s CIS strategy with 
special regard to Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan” gave new impetus to post-Soviet 
research in the IWE and its partner the Hungarian Academy of Sciences’ Research In-
stitute of Sociology. The new opportunity was important especially because the CIS or 
post-Soviet space had become a neglected area in Hungary over the previous 15 years 
and there was a research gap to fill. 
Meanwhile the post-Soviet space has been returning to the political agenda in the 
last year or two, due to rising ambitions in a strengthened Russia, sharp conflicts 
within the post-Soviet space, and worldwide problems of energy supply and prices. The 
research seeks to provide up-to-date answers to such emerging questions. 
The project sets out to cover a wide range of essential issues about the CIS space, 
notably the three most important countries for Hungary: Russia, Ukraine and Kazakh-
stan. It deals with the issues such as the regional energy prospects, the integration and 
disintegration processes among the CIS states, the formulation of relations with the 
European Union and with other important actors worldwide, and the effects of the 
world economy in the region. In conjunction with the key economic questions, it exam-
ines the current social and political changes and the various political systems. 
The intention is to create not just a network of Hungarian specialists on the post-
Soviet space, but an international network of researchers from these newly independent 
states. Inviting outside researchers and think-tanks to join us in this project was a first 
step. The IWE is currently working with Russian and Ukrainian partners. 
This paper written by Boris Kheyfets, chief research fellow at the Institute of Eco-
nomics of the Russian Academy of Sciences, analyses a very important and challenging 
element in resurgent Russia: its growing investment activity abroad. What are the fea-
tures of Russian outward FDI and what are the extents, directions and motives behind 
them? 
 
  
Zsuzsa Ludvig 
project leader 
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1) ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: 
A NEW TREND 
 
The feature specific to the present-day 
phase of economic development in Rus-
sia is the rapid increase in outward 
flow of FDI. Whereas the 1990s had 
been dominated by illegal outward flows 
of funds – into foreign bank accounts, 
real estate or conspicuous consumption 
– there is now a clear propensity for 
business capital to transfer itself and 
expand abroad, essentially in the form 
of foreign direct investment. 
The following five sources can pro-
vide an analytical basis for examining 
Russian direct investment abroad: 
(1) Data on Russia’s international in-
vestment position calculated by the 
Central Bank of Russia (CBR). 
(2) UNCTAD publications, above all an-
nual World Investment Reports. 
(3) Federal State Statistics Service data 
on current and cumulative invest-
ment from Russia. 
(4)  Data from company reports and 
special questionnaires addressed to 
companies. 
(5) Assessment of mergers and acquisi-
tions (M&A) abroad.  
Data from these sources may differ 
(Table 1). But if used in a complex 
manner with benchmarking, they point 
towards more comprehensive under-
standing of the real situation. 
 
 
 
According to CBR data on Russia’s 
international investment position, cumu-
lative direct investment by Russian resi-
dents abroad stood at USD 209.6 billion 
on January 1, 2007 which was ten 
times higher than at the beginning of 
2001. Cumulative direct investment in-
creased by a record USD 62.9 billion in 
2006 alone (Figure 1). 
The figures above are higher than 
the official FDI outflow performance in 
the 1990s, although are not directly 
comparable. For example, CBR data 
show Russian companies being granted 
165 licences for exchange transactions 
involving direct and portfolio invest-
ments in the 1993–March 1996 period. 
The total volume of permitted transac-
tions for the period was USD 810 mil-
lion, while 15 licences issued to various 
Russian financial and industrial groups 
(Lukoil, USD 128 million; Gazprom, USD 
108 million; Surgutneftegaz, USD 87 
million) accounted for the largest share 
of foreign investment of USD 720 mil-
lion. Three-quarters of all the licences 
issued were for investment of USD 
100,000 and less.1  
UNCTAD estimates quite consistent with 
those of the CBR show Russia second 
only to Hong Kong (USD 470 billion) 
among developing and transitional 
economies, with a total FDI outflow of 
USD 156.8 billion in 2006 (Table 2). By 
2000, Russia ranked only 12th. 
However, Russia ranked only 15th by 
cumulative outward FDI at the begin-
ning of 2007 among all countries in 
the world included in UNCTAD data, 
which was a significant retreat,
                                                   
1 ITAR-TASS, May 9, 1996. 
6 
 
 Table 1 
Various estimates of Russia’s cumulative end-year stock of FDI 
(USD billion) 
 
 2000 2004 2006 
FDI outward stock (Central Bank of Russia) 20.1 107.3 209.6 
FDI outward stock (UNCTAD) 20.1 81.9 156.8 
Sum of FDI outflows (UNCTAD) 11.8 41.4 72.2 
FDI outward stock (Economist Intelligence Unit) N/A 44.4 75.2 
Foreign fixed assets of Russian multinationals N/A 25–30 62–65
FDI outward stock (Russian Gov’t Statistics Committee) N/A N/A 13.9 
Sources: www.unctad.org; www.cbr.ru; www.gks.ru; www.ma-journal.ru; author’s estimates. 
 
Figure 1 
Cumulative direct and portfolio investment abroad, start of year 
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Table 2 
The 10 top developing/transitional economies for total outward FDI in 2006 
(USD billion) 
 
Rank in 
2006 
Country A. Cumulative out-ward FDI 
B. Cumulative inward 
FDI A/B 
 2000 2006 2000 2006 2000 2006
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5.  
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10.  
Hong Kong + China 
Russian Federation 
British Virgin Islands 
Singapore 
Taiwan (Chinese Province)  
Brazil 
China 
Republic of Korea  
South Africa 
Mexico  
11.9
20.1 
67.1 
56.8 
66.7 
51.9 
27.8 
26.8 
32.3 
8.3 
689.0
156.8 
123.5 
117.6 
113.9 
87,0 
73.3 
46.8 
43.5 
35.1 
45.0
32.2 
32.1 
112.6 
17.6 
103.0 
193.3 
38.1 
43.4 
97.2 
769.0
197.7 
56.2 
210.1 
50,4 
221.9 
292.6 
71.0 
77.0 
228.6 
0.26 
0.62 
2.09 
0.50 
3.79 
0.50 
0.14 
0.70 
0.74 
0.09 
0.89
0.79 
2.20 
0.56 
2.26 
0.39 
0.25 
0.66 
0.56 
0.15 
Source: UNCTAD (2007), 255–8. 
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compared with most OECD countries. 
But it should be noted that there was a 
higher growth rate in its share in world 
outward FDI, from 0.3 per cent in 
2000 to 1.3 per cent in 2006. 
Foreign portfolio investment (FPI) is 
also expanding. It accounted for 5.9 
per cent of cumulative direct investment 
in 2006. But the dynamics of portfolio 
investment remain unstable. Back in 
2003–5, FPI by Russian business was 
doubling each year, but in 2006 there 
was a marked decline. Some FPI may 
be defined as strategic due to its 
amount and the prospective role of the 
investment for the host country. This 
pertained in 2007 when Basic Element 
affiliates gradually acquired 9.99 per 
cent of the shares in the major con-
struction holding company Hochtief AG, 
a leader in construction and manage-
ment of infrastructure objects, paying 
USD 500 million. 
Outward FDI in 2006 came to 16 
per cent of Russia’s GDP. In other 
words, financial capital is becoming an 
important source of Russian economic 
development, along with natural and 
intellectual capital. 
2) SPECIFIC FEATURES OF 
RUSSIA’S BUSINESS EXPANSION 
ABROAD 
There are some certain distinctive fea-
tures of the way Russian business is 
expanding abroad: 
(a) Most of the FDI is done by a 
handful of major companies. 
(b) Russian business has insufficient in-
ternational competitive edge. 
(c) Russian outward FDI is concen-
trated mainly in the raw-materials 
sector. 
Let us look at these in more detail. 
(a) Following the UNCTAD approach that 
has become prevalent in the last few 
years, any company with a branch 
abroad can be referred to as a trans-
national corporation (TNC) regardless of 
the amount involved in foreign transac-
tions.2 By 2005, the Moscow Interna-
tional Business Association (MIBAS) had 
processed data on almost 350 projects 
by 137 Russian companies acquiring or 
negotiating to acquire assets abroad. 
But MIBAS estimates that the true num-
ber could be three or four times 
higher, as second or even third-echelon 
companies have been active in buying 
assets abroad in recent years, due to a 
favourable economic situation that has 
made the financial resources available.3 
However, the author thinks there 
may be 5000–10,000 business firms 
that qualify as transnationals according 
to the UNCTAD criteria, even if purely 
offshore companies engaged exclusively 
in financial transactions are omitted. 
There are exceptionally large numbers 
to be found in states bordering Russia. 
For example, Kazakhstan had almost 
1900 organizations with a Russian stake 
in the early 2000s, Armenia 590, 
Moldova 370, Mongolia 200, and 
Georgia almost 190. 
                                                   
2 Before the late 1990s, only companies with a 
turnover exceeding USD 100 million and activi-
ties in no fewer than six countries were termed 
transnationals by UNCTAD. 
3 Borisov, A. (2005), 104. 
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Meanwhile the main outflow of FDI 
comes from only 10–15 top-echelon 
companies, and Russia’s outward stock 
of FDI remains lower than those of 
other developed and developing econo-
mies, despite a marked increase in 
2005–6. Moscow School of Management 
Skolkovo data obtained mainly with 
questionnaires puts foreign assets of 
USD 60 billion in the hands of the 25 
biggest contributors (measured by busi-
ness activity abroad), with total em-
ployment at 130,000 at the beginning 
of 2007. These aggregate figures for 
25 TNCs correspond to the figures for 
a single TNC in 2005 (Procter & Gam-
ble), which ranked 20th among the 
largest non-financial TNCs by volume of 
foreign assets. Only two Russian TNCs 
(Gazprom and Lukoil) had foreign as-
sets in excess of USD 10 billion (Table 
3).4 
However, the difference in foreign 
assets between Lukoil and RAO EES 
(ranked 15th) is almost 26-fold. It 
should be noted, however, that compa-
rable data for 2004 shows LUKOIL’s for-
                                                   
4 http://www.skolkovo.ru/content/ 
view/174/79/lang,ru/. 
Table 3 
The 25 top Russian companies by foreign assets, 2006 
(USD million) 
 
 Company Industry Foreign assets, USD million Branches etc. abroad
1 Lukoil Oil and gas 18,921 182 
2 Gazprom Oil and gas 10,572 105 
3 Severstal Metallurgy/mining 4,546 102 
4 RUSAL Steel/mining 4,150 25 
5 Sovkomflot Transport 2,530 20 
6 Norilsk Nickel Metallurgy/mining 2,427 20 
7 Sistema, JSFC Communications/retail 2,290 19 
8 Vympelcom Communications/retail 2,103 17 
9 Novoship Transport 1,797 16 
10 ТNК-ВР Oil and gas 1,601 13 
11 Evraz Steel/mining 1,322 12 
12 DVMP Transport 1,074 12 
13 PMP Transport 1,055 12 
14 NLMK Metallurgy/mining 964 11 
15 RAO EES Energy 514 10 
16 TMK Steel/mining 490 9 
17 Evrokhim Agricultural chemicals 456 9 
18 GAZ group Machine engineering 366 8 
19 OMZ Machine engineering 354 7 
20 Alrosa Metallurgy/mining 294 6 
21 CHTPZ Metallurgy/mining 244 6 
22 NK Alliance Oil and gas 211 4 
23 Akron Agricultural chemicals 200 2 
24 Evroset Communications/retail 147 2 
25 Mechel Metallurgy/mining 116 1 
 All industries 58,744 650 
 
9 
 
eign assets at only one 58th of General 
Electric’s and one 20th of British Petro-
leum’s. LUKOIL ranked 160th in the for-
eign assets global rating.5 The Boston 
Consulting Group list of 100 leading 
world-market competitors, representing 
rapidly growing economies, includes 
only seven Russian, 44 Chinese and 12 
Brazilian firms.6  
 
Nowadays up to a third of all cross-
border M&A involves over USD 10 bil-
lion. Russian firms have never done 
such transactions and there have been 
few deals exceeding USD billion, almost 
all of them in the last two or three 
years (Table 3).  
The major M&A deals have been the 
acquisition of LionOre Mining Interna-
tional Ltd., a Canadian-based nickel and 
copper producer, by Norilsk Nickel for 
USD 6.3 billion; the acquisition of 
IPSCO, a Canadian-based metallurgical 
company, by Evraz Group for over USD 
4 billion (IPSCO assets of about USD 
1.7 billion will be transferred to Trub-
naya Metallurgicheskaya Kompaniya in 
two stages); and consolidation of the 
aluminium assets of Swiss-based Glen-
core (about USD 3 billion) and RUSAL 
and SUAL assets. According to UNCTAD 
experts, Russian cross-border M&A in 
2006 accounted for less than 0.5 per 
cent of the global amount, which is 5–7 
times lower than Russia’s share in 
global GDP and exports.7   
(b) Russia’s expansion abroad could 
have been greater, but the international 
M&A market in recent years has seen a 
marked increase in competition. Accord-
ing to one intelligence group (M&A 
                                                   
5 UNCTAD (2006). 
6 Forum (2006), 4. 
7 UNCTAD (2007), 273. 
Magazine), M&A deals involving Russian 
capital of more than USD 50.2 billion 
failed to materialize in 2006 alone.8 
Such failed deals include the asset con-
solidations of Arcelor and Severstal; the 
purchase of British-based Centrica and 
Polish-based PGNIG; Gazprom’s entry 
into a Russian/Ukrainian/German gas 
consortium in Ukraine; the exchange of 
assets between Gazprom and the Italian-
based ENI to obtain a controlling inter-
est in the energy company Enipower; 
the acquisition of Pakistan Steel by 
MMK; and certain Lukoil projects for 
acquiring oil-refining facilities, etc. 
Failed foreign M&A deals continued in 
2007–8, for example Basic Element’s 
failure to increase its stake in German-
based Hochtief AG; Aeroflot’s failure to 
purchase the Italian airline Alitalia; 
Gazprom’s failure to purchase Basket 
Dogalgaz, a Turkish-based gas distribu-
tor, etc. 
Apart from purely political reasons, 
most such failures were due to the low 
competitive capacity of Russian compa-
nies in the international M&A market. 
Russian companies are often less com-
petitive than players from developed 
countries and even some developing 
economies. According to an Economist 
Intelligence Unit study done at the re-
quest of RUSAL, only 10 per cent of 
Western business leaders questioned 
thought Russian companies were com-
petitive in the international market.9  
(c) The foreign expansion structure was 
dominated by direct investment in assets 
related to production and primary re-
fining of fuel and raw materials. This 
                                                   
8 www.advisers.ru/survey/article986.html?t_ 
page=print. 
9 Economist Intelligence Unit (2006). 
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largely reflects the structure of the do-
mestic economy. By the end of 2006, 
the oil and gas sector accounted for 
over half the foreign assets, and metal-
lurgy and mining for a quarter.10 Met-
allurgy increased its share in total 
amount cumulative foreign investment 
significantly in 2007 and 2008. 
Naturally, Russian energy and metal-
lurgy companies have sought to diver-
sify production by acquiring vertically 
integrated assets, through which prod-
ucts are sold to end-users or fuel and 
energy products of higher added value. 
Evraz was one to increase the share of 
such products (railway products, flat 
sections, steel structure reinforcements, 
etc.) in overall production from 65 to 
80 per cent. However, this contributes 
little to overall situation. 
The raw-materials sector is jealously 
protected by national governments. 
UNCTAD data record 150 new foreign 
investment-related restrictions imposed in 
2002–6, as against 51 in 1997–2001. 
The world is facing a serious battle for 
natural resources, with energy security 
becoming a prime concern. So state 
protection is rising in the very sphere 
where Russian TNCs are most powerful. 
For example, there was a scandal in 
the UK in 2006 simply over rumours 
that Gazprom might acquire the local 
gas supplier Centrica. This became one 
of the reasons behind further amend-
ments to the 2002 Business Activities 
Act, changing the way M&A deals are 
supervised. Such amendments could 
have authorized the authorities to block 
M&A deals in energy whether they were 
deemed to threaten to national security. 
                                                   
10 http://www.skolkovo.ru/content/view/ 
174/79/lang,ru/. 
The 2002 act already authorizes the UK 
government to veto deals threatening 
national security, but it does not cover 
the energy market. 
3) INCENTIVES TO INVEST 
ABROAD 
Incentives to invest abroad can be con-
veniently divided into two groups: pull 
and push factors.  
The pull factors for Russian compa-
nies include entry to new sales markets; 
extension of the raw-material base, 
overcoming tariff and non-tariff barriers 
applicable in regional integration group-
ings; diversification of business activities; 
a chance to acquire assets that have 
been undervalued, for example, through 
privatization in certain CEE, CIS or 
Third World countries, which took 
place later than in Russia. 
However, the push factors may have 
similar importance for Russian compa-
nies. First, the accessibility of new assets 
is dwindling, as the main resources at 
home are finite. Secondly, heavy activity 
by Russian and foreign companies has 
increased domestic competition in seek-
ing for new paths of development. 
Thirdly, Russian companies often use 
transnationalization to decrease depend-
ence on the state, which has tended to 
increase in recent years. Finally, gaining 
new companies may avert third-party 
claims on previous ones. Diversifying 
country risks by acquiring foreign as-
sets may protect existing investments 
and provide defence against hostile 
takeover bids.  
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Also to be considered are some spe-
cific incentives for private Russian 
companies to expand abroad, one of 
which was noted by the Canadian 
newspaper The Globe and Mail: “We 
suspect that Russian oligarchs when 
purchasing shares of foreign companies 
in open tenders are likely to buy re-
spectability and get rid of their images 
as robber barons.”11 However, large 
companies these days disregard this 
factor almost entirely. 
Another specific incentive refers more 
to psychology and ambitions: expansion 
in recent years by Russian retailers. In 
2007, the Wild Orchid Company, well-
known in Russia, opened its first store 
abroad in London. London also has a 
Russian furniture store, Mr. Doors. In 
2006, Le Futur, a chain of gift stores, 
set up a joint venture in Turkey; Sela 
opened a store for casual wear in 
Warsaw; and Baden Company opened 
two stores in Italy. Experts explain 
these moves not just as risk-spreading 
and a search for new experience, but 
as a self-imposed test of competitive 
viability.12  
4) THE BENEFITS OF FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT  
The acquisition of foreign assets helps 
to reduce operating costs and gain ad-
ditional competitive advantage in export 
and domestic transactions, and offers 
additional benefits when borrowing in 
international markets (decreasing the 
                                                   
11 Globe and Mail, May 14, 2007. 
12 Vedomosti, August 21, 2007.  
cost of borrowing) or in IPO (increas-
ing demand and obtainable prices). So 
it can be said that foreign expansion 
adds synergy to the development of the 
group as a whole, which in turn has a 
positive impact on the whole Russian 
economy. 
 Other positive impacts on Russian 
economic development are these: 
∗ It enhances exports of goods and 
services by companies or foreign 
trade organizations, and increases 
revenue of other national players in-
volved in foreign trade. 
∗ It increases competitive capacity in 
leading companies, by extending the 
resource base, employing cheaper la-
bour, extending the production scale, 
and drawing in new technologies, 
management experience, etc., which 
benefits competitive growth of the 
economy as a whole. 
∗ It brings an increase in business 
transparency. For example, IPO or 
preparation of borrowing investment 
memoranda for international financial 
markets provides more information 
than any CBR efforts to disclose 
bank’s beneficiaries.  
∗ It creates additional scope for mac-
roeconomic policy. For example, sig-
nificant currency outflow helps the 
monetary authorities to curb the 
strength of the rouble. 
∗ It reinforces Russian political influ-
ence in certain countries and regions. 
In the rare cases where government 
invests in foreign assets, the state 
budget gains the income. For example, 
a 50 per cent share in Russian–Vietnam 
JV Vietsovpetro is on the books of the 
Federal Service for Federal Property 
12 
 
Management and contributed USD 761.7 
million to the federal budget in 2006. 
This constituted a high proportion of 
the total proceeds gained from state 
property.13  
Foreign investment may notably be 
used to modernize the economy and 
improve export structure. Though rela-
tively small, there has been clear in-
crease in recent years. 
In April 2006, for example, Smart 
Hydrogen (a JV between Norilsk Nickel 
and Interros) acquired for USD 241 
million 35 per cent of Plug Power, a 
leading US developer and producer of 
hydrogen energy equipment. The part-
ners plan to start production of such 
energy systems in Russia in 2008, as-
sisted by Power Plug. 
Vekselberg’s Renova entered the new 
market of alternative energy in Europe. 
Renova had already established a Swiss 
company, Avelar Energy, and in 2007 
acquired the Italian energy trader Ener-
getic Source. Renova plans to invest 
over USD 1 billion in wind, solar and 
bio energy and to pursue activities re-
lated to renewable energy sources. 
Some promising M&A deals have 
been made in car manufacturing. In 
2006, the Deripaska-controlled GAZ 
Group acquired 100 per cent of LDV 
Holdings, a UK producer of light com-
mercial vehicles. The main product is a 
Maxus light commercial vehicle to be 
                                                   
13 In December 2006 the ownership structure of 
the JV changed, which will decrease direct 
budget income from foreign investment. Russia’s 
share in the JV was purchased by Zarubezhneft, 
OJSC (wholly owned by the Russian Federation). 
Zarubezhneft receives as a management fee 5 
per cent of the income due to Russian interests. 
Zarubezhneft is expected to devote all income 
due to Russia and received in full to increasing 
investment in Vietnam, other countries, and 
Russia itself. 
produced in Nizhny Novgorod after ad-
aptation to Russian conditions.  
Rostselmash purchased for USD 150 
million 80 per cent of Buhler Industries 
Inc., a Canadian manufacturer of trac-
tors and agricultural equipment. Buhler-
Russia LLC has already been founded to 
assemble Buhler tractors in Russia and 
a tractor plant is being built in Kras-
nodar Region, with an export annual 
output of 480 tractors. 
M. Bolotin, president of Tractor 
Plants group, bought 100 per cent of 
Malaysia-based Dunham-Bush, makers 
of air-conditioning and refrigerator 
equipment, in a USD 90 million deal. In 
2008, Tractor Plants planned to start 
greenfield construction and reach an 
annual turnover of USD 300 million 
within five years, to make it a major 
supplier of compressor equipment in 
Russia and the CIS countries. 
Vekselberg’s Renova has acquired big 
stakes in the Swiss-based car-making 
groups Oerlikon and Sulzer. Oerlikon 
will build a plant in the Nizhny Nov-
gorod region for applying coatings to 
various parts, in particular automotive 
components, for supply to Russian fac-
tories. Oerlikon already has over 70 
centres worldwide and car-making ac-
counts for 60–70 per cent of its pro-
duction. Sulzer is the world’s second 
biggest producer of oil-pumping equip-
ment and industrial pumps. 
A new target for Russian foreign in-
vestment is high-quality construction 
services, where again the aim is to ap-
ply the experience of foreign partners 
to Russia. In 2007, Basic Element pur-
chased 30 per cent of STRABAG, a lead-
ing European construction holding com-
pany with 50,000 staff located 
13 
 
throughout Europe and a global turn-
over of about €10 billion. STRABAG fo-
cuses on construction of industrial, 
commercial premises and residential 
buildings, roads, tunnels and other 
communications. Following this M&A 
deal, STRABAG is rapidly increasing its 
construction order book. It will be 
among the major contractors for the 
Winter Olympics at Sochi. 
5) EFFORTS TO BE GLOBAL 
Despite the importance of the positive 
factors mentioned, foreign investment by 
Russian business has another side: ac-
quisition of foreign assets as a condition 
for survival in the current competition 
battles. The forecast is that a handful 
of major companies will be setting the 
pace in some industries in the near fu-
ture. There is little time left for becom-
ing a global company by acquiring for-
eign assets or merging with major for-
eign players. This approach is well un-
derstood by top Russian government 
officials who have set the objective of 
establishing Russian-based global com-
panies in all industries. As the newly 
elected President D. Medvedev noted in 
his manifesto in February 2008, “We 
need to extend significantly export sup-
port measures for Russian-based com-
panies abroad, to improve the Russian 
business image abroad.”14 He called for 
Russian businessmen to be more aggres-
sive in investing in foreign acquisitions, 
and he promised state support for and 
                                                   
14 http://www.newsru.com/russia/15feb2008/ 
medved4i7z_print.html. 
assistance to national business in foreign 
markets. 
Several Russian companies have been 
pursuing such a policy for a long time. 
Lukoil, operating in 19 countries, plans 
to channel a third of its investment into 
acquisitions, mainly abroad, according 
to its development strategy for 2007–
16. Target areas are Iraq, Central Asia 
and Latin America for production, 
while retail sales will increase in 
Europe and the foreign share of oil 
refining from under 30 per cent to 44. 
Gazprom, the second largest oil and 
gas company by sales turnover, also 
intends to be involved in various up-
stream and downstream projects in 
third countries, as part of a strategy of 
gaining a global presence in world oil 
and gas markets by participating in 
auctions, tenders and share-swap trans-
actions. One objective is to add Central 
Asian gas to its resource portfolio. In 
the longer term, Gazprom is also look-
ing to acquire various energy assets in 
Europe and shares in regasification ter-
minals and other gas assets in the 
United States, which ties in with plans 
to build gas liquefaction facilities in 
Russia. The developing economies of 
most interest to Gazprom are Vene-
zuela, Vietnam, India and some Caspian 
countries. The company’s strategy is to 
establish a complete value chain – from 
upstream to downstream in markets 
where the company is not present yet. 
Rosneft hopes to become one of the 
five leading energy companies world-
wide by capitalization. To become a 
genuinely international company, it plans 
to acquire foreign oil-production and 
oil-refining assets. For example, it 
agreed in 2006 with CNPC to establish 
Vostok Energy, a JV that will construct 
14 
 
an oil refinery with a capacity of 10 
million tonnes in China and approxi-
mately 300 filling stations there. In July 
2007, Rosneft signed a strategic coop-
eration agreement with Royal Dutch 
Shell, under which the latter may have 
access to new Russian fields, and the 
former become co-owner of a European 
oil refinery. Rosneft and the Indian-
based Oil and Natural Gas Corporation 
(ONGC) will construct an LNG terminal 
in the south of India. 
Companies already established or in 
the process of establishment include air-
craft, shipbuilding and nanotechnology 
corporations and Atomenergoprom. They 
will also make efforts to spread their 
operations worldwide. For example, the 
asset value of Atomenergoprom assets 
will rise from USD 40–50 billion to 
USD 100 billion by 2010, as equity con-
tributions are made by 30 companies, 
including Tekhsnabexport, TVEL Corpo-
ration, and Atomergomash. This will 
make Atomenergoprom a powerful 
competitor on international market for 
such major players as Westinghouse 
Toshiba (capitalization USD 24.3 billion), 
Areva (USD 37.8 billion), the German-
based Siemens (USD 108.6 billion), and 
General Electric (USD 368.5 billion). 
Russian metallurgy companies (NLMK, 
Severstal, Mechel, Norilsk Nickel) are 
also expanding abroad aggressively. 
Abramovich affiliates acquired 41 per 
cent of the Evraz Group and put the 
company top for M&A (Table 3). In 
2007, Evraz’s foreign steel companies 
accounted for 25 per cent of its reve-
nues and the group ranked fourth in 
the world among steel companies by 
capitalization.15 
                                                   
15 Vedomosti, March 4, 2008. 
In 2007, a new Russian-based TNC 
emerged: the United Company Russian 
Aluminum (UC RUSAL) mentioned before. 
Some experts are forecasting a consoli-
dation and merger with certain Russia-
based companies, which will naturally 
strengthen its capacity to invest abroad. 
Specifically, a merger of Norilsk Nickel 
and UC RUSAL (which already purchased 
25 per cent of Norilsk Nickel in 2008) 
will produce a large metallurgical com-
pany. The shareholding previously 
owned by one of the co-owners of 
Norilsk Nickel, M. Prokhorov, amounted 
to USD 4.5 billion in cash and 11 per 
cent in UC RUSAL shares. Usmanov’s 
Gazmetal intends to acquire a stake 
from the second co-owner of Norilsk 
Nickel, V. Potanin, and may join the 
above two companies. 
Alrosa, which accounts for 25 per 
cent of the world’s diamond production 
and 97 per cent of Russia’s, is imple-
menting two projects in Africa. The 
company owns 32.8 per cent of Catoca, 
a diamond field in Angola which is a 
JV owned by local-based Endiama, Is-
rael-based Daumonty Financing, and 
Brazil-based Odebrecht. Also in Angola, 
Alrosa is developing diamond pipes un-
der the Luo project, in which it has a 
45 per cent stake. Alrosa now plans to 
expand its African presence into South 
Africa and Namibia, and invest up to 
USD 800 million in projects on the con-
tinent. 
Leading Russian-based mobile-phone 
operators (Sistema, JSFC, Altimo) are 
also intending to go global. In 2007–8 
they entered some Asian mobile markets 
(India, Indonesia, Vietnam, Cambodia). 
For example, Sistema and JSFC plan to 
invest up to USD 7 billion in its Indian 
projects. Some estimates suggest that 
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Russian-based companies now control 
three quarters of the mobile market in 
CIS countries. Sberbank intents to ex-
pand its foreign activities. By 2014, up 
to 20 per cent of its income will come 
from these, as opposed to only one per 
cent at present.16 
Many other examples could be given. 
6) CONSEQUENCES 
There are some specific features in the 
foreign expansion of Russian business 
that point to some negative impacts for 
domestic economic development, and 
naturally so, as private interests are 
often inconsistent with public ones. So it 
is no coincidence that Russians are still 
hostile to such foreign expansion. A 
September 2005 poll by WCIOM (Rus-
sian Public Opinion Research Centre) 
had 54 per cent of respondents thinking 
expansion of Russian business abroad 
should be curbed, as it encouraged job 
exports and outflows of finance, and 
only 21 per cent supporting it.17 
                                                   
16 Vedomosti, April 4, 2008. 
17 WCIOM (2006), 13 
Foreign investment indeed absorbs a 
major part of the financial resources of 
Russian business and so restricts capac-
ity to invest at home. Domestic fixed 
capital investment in 2006 (at nominal 
exchange rates) was a little over USD 
1754 billion – about three times the 
cumulative FDI in that year. Further-
more, income from foreign assets is 
seldom repatriated to Russia. It is al-
most all reinvested, so swelling foreign 
assets further. Experts have estimated 
that large foreign acquisitions in 2006 
amounted to USD 11–13 billion or 18–
20 per cent of the total increase in 
foreign investment stock (USD 62.9 bil-
lion) as assessed by the CBR. So rein-
vestment from foreign assets forms an 
essential part of the increase in foreign 
investment (up to 80 per cent, see Fig-
ure 2). 
Principally due to the increase in 
foreign investment, the foreign debt of 
Russian-based companies and banks ex-
ceeded USD 400 billion by January 1, 
2008 (compared to less than USD 30 
billion in 2000). Such companies had 
borrowed relatively cheaply from West-
ern banks to effect their foreign M&A. 
The credit crisis that spread in 2007–8 
Figure 2 
Year-on rise in cumulative FDI and M&A by Russian firms 
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brought an increase in borrowing value 
that limited the scope for re-borrowing, 
new borrowing and IPO significantly. 
Russian TNCs show unusually high 
levels of foreign-affiliate sales as a pro-
portion to total sales, with similar inter-
nationalization in foreign assets and 
employment. Table 4 indicates that the 
integral transnationality index for almost 
all Russian-based TNCs (except shipping 
companies) is primarily due to the high 
level of transnational sales, while indices 
of asset transnationalization, the basic 
figure for TNCs, are substantially less 
than for leading TNCs in developed and 
developing economies. 
Concentration of income in foreign 
branches of Russian-based TNCs sub-
stantially reduces the tax base for the 
Russian budget. For example, ISFR data 
for 2003 that include offshore traders 
of Evraz Group (Ferrotrade UK and 
Ferrotrade Gibraltar) but not its Russian 
enterprises accounted for over half its 
revenue and over 75 per cent of its net 
income.18 
Foreign investment does not always 
help to improve the Russian image 
abroad, though many negative features 
of Russian business practice are pur-
posely exaggerated by competitors. But 
it has to be said that such propaganda  
                                                   
18 Vedomosti. 2006/03/02. 
Table 4
Transnationality indices, 2004 
(per cent) 
 
TNC Industry Assets Sales Employ. Index*
Lukoil (Russia) Oil 26.2 78.0 9.2 37.8
Norilsk Nickel (Russia)  
Non-ferrous metallurgy 10.4 84.9 
 
1.8 32.3 
Novoship (Russia) Transport 91.7 85.0 1.4 58.9
RUSAL (Russia) Non-ferrous metallurgy 11.4 81.2 8.6 62.9
Primorsk Shipping (Russia)** Transport 86.4 77.6 50.0 71.3
Mechel (Russia) Ferrous metallurgy 3.3 60.6 13.0 25.6
Far East Shipping (Russia)** Transport 32.5 31.2 4.2 22.8
Alrosa (Russia)** Mining 1.0 45.3 0.0 15.4
Gazprom (Russia) Oil and gas … 67.3 … …
OMZ (Russia) Heavy machinery 38.5 51.7 38.5 42.9
Severstal (Russia) Ferrous metallurgy 2.6 59.3 13.0 25.0
General Electric (US) Electrical and electronic 
equipment 59.8 37.2 
 
46.3 47.8 
Vodafone (UK) Telecom 95.8 85.3 80.1 87.1
Ford Motors (US) Car manufacturing 58.9 41.6 45.5 48.7
British Petroleum (UK) Oil industry 80.0 81.5 83.1 81.5
Hutchison Whampoa (HK, 
China) 
 
Various industries 80.4 49.5 
 
82.8 70.9 
Petronas (Malaysia) Oil industry 36.0 29.3 11.8 25.7
SingTel (Singapore) Telecom 75.9 69.9 45.3 67.1
Samsung Electronics (S. Korea) Electrical and electronic 
equipment 21.9 77.7 
 
34.3 44.7 
Citic Group (China) Various 17.0 27.2 17.1 20.4
Notes: * Integrated transnationality index – an average of three such indices: foreign assets/total assets; 
foreign sales/total sales; employed in foreign branches/ total employed; ** data for 2003; data for 2003–4 
used as the 2005 date in the 2007 World Investment Report excludes Russia. Calculated with data from 
UNCTAD (2005), 272; UNCTAD (2006), 286. 
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is not always groundless. Transparency 
International, studying how foreign 
firms influence corruption in host coun-
tries (for 2002) placed Russia 28th of 
30 countries studied.19 According to 
Trust Barometer studies in autumn 
2006 by Edelman, Russian business was 
trusted by only 15 per cent of top 
managers in Europe, 20 per cent in 
North America, 42 per cent in Asia and 
44 per cent in Latin America.20 
7) WHERE TO INVEST 
ABROAD 
There are no accurate statistics on the 
geographical spread of foreign invest-
ment by Russian-based companies. 
Sometimes the firms acquired are just 
nominally located in a certain country 
while they invest elsewhere. Such com-
panies are often resident in jurisdictions 
that experts view as offshore (Nether-
lands, Great Britain, Ireland, Canada), 
and structured in a complicated man-
ner, using subsidiaries in classic off-
shore havens. 
For example, Nelson Resources Lim-
ited, acquired by Lukoil in 2005 for 
over USD 2.1 billion has its assets in 
Kazakhstan but is registered in Ber-
muda. Controlling interests in it were 
held by two large financial and indus-
trial groups (Kazkommerzbank and 
Narodny Bank of Kazakhstan).21 LioOre 
Mining International Ltd, registered in 
                                                   
19 www. transparency.org.  
20 Edelman Trust Barometer. 2007. P.20 
(www.edelman.com). 
21 Vremya Novostey. 2005/05/12.  
Canada, has most of its assets in Aus-
tralia and Africa. The many other in-
stances include the acquisition of Celtic 
Resources (an Ireland-based gold pro-
ducer) by Severstal for some USD 330 
million in January 2008. The underlying 
assets are in Kazakhstan (100 per cent 
of the Suzdal gold mine, 75.5 per cent 
of the Zherek mine, and 50 per cent of 
the Shorskoye molybdenum mine) and 
Russia (74.5 per cent of the project for 
the Tominskoye copper and gold field 
and 100 per cent in the Mikheevskoye 
copper and gold field in the Chelyab-
insk Region). 
In this regard, geography results will 
vary according to the criteria as ad-
hered to: by location of basic assets or 
registered office. Much of investing is 
carried out through offshore companies, 
which as well distorts the geography of 
investments. And all this illustrates why 
particular experts and official informa-
tional sources vary so deeply in their 
estimates of actual Russian OFDI stocks. 
The Federal State Statistics Service 
(Rosstat) is the only official source able 
to supply overall information on the ten 
countries that have accumulated the 
biggest stocks of Russian OFDI and to 
itemize OFDI by countries (not by OFDI 
stocks accumulated) and by certain CIS 
countries. It should be noted that OFDI 
constitutes rather more than two-fifths 
of all OFI, while credits and loans ac-
count for the greater part. 
As Table 1 shows, Rosstat supplies 
the lowest figures for OFDI, five or six 
time lower than the average figures 
supplied by other sources. This is be-
cause it publishes only data on invest-
ment made by non-financial institutions, 
disregarding financial investment and 
such transactions as share acquisitions 
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by foreign companies in the secondary 
market, reinvestment, or investment 
through companies incorporated abroad.  
These points are relevant to interpret-
ing the data in Table 5. 
The table does not give data for 
Russian OFDI stocks in Uzbekistan or 
Moldova, which do not feature in the 
top ten by overall OFI stocks. 
According to Rosstat data, over 
three-quarters of outward investment 
accumulated by the end of 2007 had 
been made in offshore or closely related 
territories, of which the following are 
specified: Cyprus 33.1 per cent in 2007 
(18.4 per cent in 2006), BVI 14.6 per 
cent, and Netherlands 23.1 per cent. 
Cyprus is notable for its share of over-
all OFDI stocks (13.5 per cent), which 
exceeds the proportion found in other 
countries. 
There are several thousand partly 
Russian-owned firms investing in Russia 
and in foreign countries. Lanebrook, 
incorporated in Cyprus, holds a control-
ling interest in the Evraz group, the 
current leader among Russian TNCs by 
OFDI stock. In November 2007, Lane-
brook acquired shares in five Ukrainian 
enterprises from Privat Ukrainian Indus-
trial Group (99.25 per cent shares of 
Sukhaya Balka Mining and Concentra-
tion Complex, 95.57 per cent of the 
Dnepropetrovsk Metallurgic Plant named 
after Petrovsky, 93.74 per cent of Bag-
leykoks coking plant, 98.65 per cent of 
Dneprokoks, and 93.83 per cent of the 
Dneprodzerzhinsk Coking Plant). Other 
examples can be found in the Nether-
lands, UK, British Virgin Islands, and 
several other countries with firms estab-
lished by Russian interests. 
Investment expansion often involves 
complex, multi-level schemes. For exam-
ple, UC RUSAL, one of the biggest Rus-
sian TNCs, is managed by Dutch-based 
RUSAL Global Management BV, which 
according to its documents is fully 
owned by another of Derispaska’s com-
panies: Cyprus-based RUSAL MMC. Ltd. 
Russian OFDIs are often founded in the 
form of credit and loan associations, to 
limit political risks. This may be a par-
tial explanation for the gap between 
ODI and OFDI. 
Table 5 
Russian OFI and OFDI stocks by countries, end 2007 
(USD million) 
 
 
OFI stocks OFDI stocks OFI flows in 2007 (for 
comparison) Total % of total Total % of total
Total OFI stocks 32,061 100 13,944 100 74,630 
Ukraine 
Cyprus 
Austria 
Netherlands 
United States 
UK 
Germany 
British Virgin Is. 
Belarus 
Switzerland 
Other countries 
811 
9,985 
1,067 
7,391 
1,176 
966 
732 
4,677 
771 
461 
4,024 
2.5
31.1 
3.3 
23.1 
3.7 
3.0 
2.3 
14.6 
2.4 
1.4 
12.6 
126
1886 
2 
7231 
1134 
654 
259 
44 
660 
78 
1870 
0.9
13.5 
0.0 
51.9 
8.1 
4.7 
1.9 
0.3 
4.7 
0.6 
1.,4 
514 
9,230 
10,372 
6,874 
22,796 
1,890 
7,311 
5,083 
1,314 
4,563 
4,683 
Source: www.gks.ru. 
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The CBR provides a very low esti-
mate of Russian OFDI to CIS countries 
and specifies only two geographical di-
rections – CIS and non-CIS. According 
to the CBR data, CIS countries ac-
counted at the end of 2007 for only 
3.4 per cent of all Russian OFDI 
stocks.22 Independent experts offer 
much higher estimates. According to the 
Moscow School of Management Skolk-
ovo, the 25 biggest TNCs at the end of 
2006 had invested up to 20 per cent 
of all the foreign assets.23 Kuznetsov 
estimates that the CIS countries ac-
counted at the end of 2007 for 30 per 
cent of Russian OFI, and Ukraine, Ka-
zakhstan and Belarus for 80 per cent 
of this.24 Deutsche Bank experts basing 
their estimates on Rosstat data say the 
CIS countries took 59 per cent of Rus-
sian OFDI in 1997–9, which decreased 
to 12 per cent in 2004–6.25 
It should be noted when assessing 
the geographical spread of Russian 
OFDI that Russian companies initially 
invested mainly in adjacent and other 
familiar regions (the CIS, the Baltic, the 
CEE countries – former members of 
Comecon) and some developing coun-
tries that had enjoyed close economic 
relations with the former USSR (Viet-
nam, Mongolia, Guinea, Angola). 
In recent years, Russian-based TNCs 
started to expand aggressively into 
more distant foreign countries such as 
the United States and the EU. The same 
applied to developing countries like 
                                                   
22 http://www.cbr.ru/statistics/credit_statistics 
/print.asp?file=iip_cis.htm 
23 http://www.skolkovo.ru/content/view/174/79/ 
lang,ru/. 
24 Kuznetsov (2008) 34:4. 
25 Russia’s outward investment. Deutsche Bank 
Research. 2008, 4. 
China and India. There are also in-
stances of very large investment in Latin 
America and Africa (mainly projects 
related to mineral resources).  
8) DIRECT INVESTMENT IN 
EU COUNTRIES 
Russian firms see European countries, 
especially EU members, as attractive lo-
cations for investment, especially since 
the EU enlargement to include the CEE 
countries and Cyprus. Cyprus and the 
CEE countries have long been closely 
tied to Russia. Cyprus was an offshore 
territory for a long time, and there still 
some tax benefits for income from out-
side the Union, despite the EU accession. 
Cyprus-registered companies own nu-
merous Russian-based assets. So it is 
natural to find that according to 
Rosstat data, Cyprus accounted at the 
beginning of 2008 for 33.1 per cent of 
all Russia’s cumulative investment 
abroad (including 13.5 per cent of the 
FDI).26  
Certain investment projects imple-
mented by Russian-based TNCs in 
Europe have already been mentioned, 
but other big European M&As include 
the acquisition by Severstal of the Luc-
chini Group (a manufacturer of high-
quality steel and rolled steel products in 
Italy and France for the vehicle and 
railway industries, with its own distribu-
tion chain). Lucchini SpA accounts for 
14.1 per cent of steel production in It-
aly, and access to the EU market was 
                                                   
26 www.gks.ru. 
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one of the motives behind Severstal’s 
purchase. 
In 2006, Novolipetsk Steel (NLMK) 
set up a JV with the European steel 
group Duferco (50:50), in a deal worth 
USD 805 million. This new company 
registered in Luxembourg is to pur-
chase either 100 per cent of the shares 
or a controlling interest in 22 Duferco-
owned companies, including Duferco 
Farrell Corporation (USA), Carsid SA 
(Belgium), Duferco Clabecq SA (Bel-
gium), Duferco La Louvière SA (Bel-
gium), Duferco Coating SAS (France), 
Sorral SA (France), Acciaierie Grigoli 
SpA (Italy) and Duferco Transformation 
Europe (France). 
In addition to car manufacturing, 
Russian companies are attracted by light 
industry and the food industry, agricul-
ture, trading, the hotel industry and 
other fields. There are exotic invest-
ments as well: acquisition of shares in 
English football clubs by Russian billion-
aires R. Abramovitch (GBP 140 million) 
and A. Usmanov (GBP 75 million), of 
the Versace villa by A. Novikov, a Rus-
sian multimillionaire restaurateur for 
GBP 26 million, and of the Hediard 
chain of French gastronomy boutiques 
by S. Pugachev, businessman and repre-
sentative of the Republic of Tuva in the 
Federal Assembly. Such acquisitions are 
often made simply for prestige. 
Europe continues to claim Russia is a 
threat to European economic security. 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel 
stated at the beginning of 2007 that 
Europe might block Russian expansion 
if Moscow blocks European investors.27 
This view is also apparent in the report 
“Perspectives of the Internal EU Gas 
                                                   
27 The Times, September 1, 2007.  
and Electricity Market” approved by the 
European Parliament in July 2007, 
which recommends that third-country 
companies be prohibited from purchas-
ing energy infrastructure objects unless 
there is reciprocal approval for such.28 
The European Commission will consider 
the report when devising legislation on 
EU energy markets. 
Such claims were denied by Vladimir 
Putin at press conference after the Rus-
sian-EU Summit in October 2007), 
where he called rumours that that Rus-
sian companies were buying up all 
European assets with Russian petrodol-
lars exaggerated. Aggregate cumulative 
European investment in the Russian 
economy had reached almost €30 billion 
by mid-2007, while Russian investment 
in Europe stood at only €3 billion.29 
Russian and European companies set-
tle their objective problems by exchang-
ing various assets, which enables them 
to minimize losses through various pro-
tectionist restrictions. 
Gazprom started to employ share ex-
changes with foreign investors actively. 
Gazprom and the German-based Win-
tershal (100 per cent owned by BASF 
Chemicals) exchanged 25 per cent of 
the voting shares minus 1 share and 10 
per cent of the preference shares in 
Gazprom’s subsidiary SevernefteGaz-
prom, which holds the sub-soil licence 
for the Yuzhno-Russkoye oil and gas 
condensate field and 15 per cent of the 
shares minus 1 share in Wingas (Gaz-
prom owns 35 per cent of shares in 
                                                   
28 Vedomosti, July 11, 2007.  
29 Путин В.В. Заявление для прессы и 
ответы на вопросы по итогам XX cаммита 
Россия–Евросоюз 
(http://www.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2007/10/14
9679.shtml). 
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this company), which owns cross-
country gas pipelines in Germany and 
holds a lease on Reden, one of the big-
gest underground gas-storage facilities. 
The field is to become the principal 
raw-material base for the North Euro-
pean gas pipeline to be built between 
Vyborg, Russia, and Greifswald, Ger-
many, under the Baltic Sea). Further-
more, Wintershal is to deliver 49 per 
cent of its shares in oil concessions С97 
and С98, situated in Libya. 
In exchange for 50 per cent of the 
shares minus 1 share in two Hungarian 
E.ON subsidiaries (E.ON Földgáz Storage 
– underground storage in Hungary; 
E.ON. Földgáz Trade – a gas trader) 
and 25 per cent of shares plus 1 share 
in E.ON Hungaria, a regional gas and 
utility company, Gazprom delivered to 
E.ON a 25 per cent shareholding (mi-
nus 1 share) in the development of the 
Yuzhno-Russkoye oil and gas condensate 
field.30 
Gazprom offered the Netherlands-
based Nederlandse Gasunie the chance 
to participate in construction of the 
North European Gas Pipeline. The com-
pany will obtain up to 9 per cent of 
the shares in the consortium established 
for the purpose, and in return, Russian 
gas will be given access to Britain 
through a new pipeline from the Neth-
erlands constructed in conjunction with 
E.ON and the Belgian-based Fluxys. 
The Serbian authorities decided to 
change their position on selling Naftna 
Industrija Srbije (NIS), the national oil 
company, after Serbia was invited to 
participate in a South Stream project. 
Gazprom’s subsidiary managed to ac-
                                                   
30 http://www.gazprom.ru/news/2006/07/ 
131400_20438.shtml. 
quire 51 per cent of the shares in NIS 
without tender, and for a smaller con-
sideration than Serbians had asked for 
initially. In return, the Serbia will par-
ticipate in constructing a 400-km South 
Stream segment to pass over Serbian 
territory, and an underground gas 
storage-based depleted gas field in Ba-
nat (60 km NE of Novi Sad) will be 
constructed. Such agreements look set 
to make Serbia a reliable partner of 
Gazprom. 
Asset exchanges enhance trust be-
tween investors and encourage relations. 
In February 2008, Gazprom and E.ON 
signed a memorandum of understanding 
on joint construction and operation of a 
gas-turbine power plant near Lubmin in 
Germany, not far from where the North 
Stream pipeline supplying natural gas to 
the power plant enters the country. Es-
timated capacity will be 1200 MW and 
the construction investment some €700–
800 million. Gazprom and E.ON will set 
up an implementing JV on a parity ba-
sis.  
Medium-sized ventures are also in-
vesting in European industry, and often 
turning out to be far more efficient 
than large TNCs, due to their greater 
flexibility. For example, foreign expan-
sion has allowed Sintez (a Russian-based 
group well-known at home, involved 
mainly in hydrocarbons production) to 
diversify its activities substantially. Sintez 
has entered into an agreement with 
Macedonia whereby it will build a 
thermal power station with a power 
capacity of 227 MW and a thermal 
capacity of 160 MW. It will be inte-
grated into Macedonia’s energy system 
and supply 60 per cent of Skopje in-
habitants with thermal energy. The 
power station, already under construc-
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tion, has some long-term contract offers 
to supply power (from Austria, Greece, 
Switzerland). Sintez’s investment will be 
about €140 million, making it one of 
the biggest foreign investors in Mace-
donia.  
In Germany, Sintezis is implementing 
another energy project, to provide a 
110 MW power station near Leipzig. 
Sintez’s investment in the project is ex-
pected to be about €100 million.31  
In expanding abroad, Sintez has 
reputable partners. In energy, it coop-
erates with Colenco Power Engineering, 
a well-known Swiss company, Alstom 
(Switzerland) and Gama (Turkey). Sintez 
is now promoting itself in the interna-
tional market Sintez by sponsoring the 
Swiss-based team Matech Rasing, which 
participates in FIA GT3 European car 
racing with Ford cars. 
* 
To sum up, Russian companies are ex-
panding abroad in various directions. 
Though this does not always achieve 
them what they hoped and their behav-
iour is not always expert or sophisti-
cated, they are gaining experience fast 
and engaging high-quality M&A experts. 
Foreign investment by Russian companies 
is encouraged by the world economic 
situation: cheapening of some foreign 
assets under crisis and persistently high 
income from Russian raw-material ex-
ports. Also appearing is greater support 
from Russian governmental authorities. 
So foreign investment by Russian busi-
ness can be expected to expand further 
in the immediate future. 
* * * * *
                                                   
31 http://pragent.ru/public/sintez1/. 
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Table 6
The top 20 cross-border M&A transactions by Russian firms in 2004-81 
Year Foreign asset2 Purchasing firm Industry 
Value, USD 
million3 
2007 100% share in LionOre Mining International Ltd (Canada) Norilsk Nickel Metallurgy 6287 
2008 100% share in IPSCO (Canada) Evraz Group Metallurgy 4025
2006 Glenkor’s aluminum assets (Switzerland) RUSAL, Sual Metallurgy 30004
2005 100% share in Nelson Resources Ltd (Bermuda) Lukoil Fuel and en-ergy 2130 
2007 91% share in Oregon Steel Mills Inc (US) Evraz Group Metallurgy 2100
2007 30% share in STRABAG SE (Austria) Basic Element 
Construction 
and engineer-
ing 
16804 
2005 13.2% share in Turkcell Iletisim Hizmetleri (Turkey) Alfa Group Telecom 1602 
2007 16% share in Magna International Inc (Can-ada) 
RusPromAvto 
(Gaz Group) 
Car manufac-
turing 1537 
2007 30% share in Sulzer (Switzerland) Renova Holding Machinery manufacturing 1350
4 
2007 21.4% Oerlikon (Switzerland) Renova Holding Machinery manufacturing 850
4 
2007 9.99% share in Hochtief AG (Germany) Basic Element 
Construction 
and engineer-
ing 
8204 
2008 Sparrows Point (US) Severstal Metallurgy 810
2006 50% share in Steel Invest & Finance SA (Lux-embourg) NMLK Finance 805 
2007 80% Energetic Source SPA (Italy) Renova Fuel and En-ergy 700
4 
2006 79% Highveld Steel & Vanadium Corp (South Africa) Evraz Group Metallurgy 681 
2008 51,05% Delong Holdings Limited (China) Evraz Group Metallurgy 614
2008 51% share in Naftna Industrija Srbije (Serbia) Gazpromneft Fuel and en-ergy 600
4 
2005 62% share in Lucchini (Italy) Severstal Metallurgy 579
2007 Filling stations in Czech Republic, Slovakia, Belgium, Poland, Hungary Lukoil 
Oil refining / 
trading 560
4 
2006 90% share in Armentel (Armenia) Vympelcom Telecom 488
Note: 1Some share exchanges disregarded; 2asset volume acquired may have increased by purchase of 
further shares or decreased by subsequent selling; 3deal price converted into USD at rate on pur-
chase date; 4estimate. 
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